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Social Interaction, Co-Worker Altruism, and Incentives 
 
Social interaction with colleagues is an important job attribute for many workers. To attract 
and retain workers, managers therefore need to think about how to create and preserve high-
quality co-worker relationships. This paper develops a principal-multi-agent model where 
agents do not only engage in productive activities, but also in social interaction with their 
colleagues, which in turn creates co-worker altruism. We study how financial incentives for 
productive activities can improve or damage the work climate. We show that both team 
incentives and relative incentives can help to create a good work climate. 
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 1 Introduction
Social interaction with colleagues is a highly valued job aspect for many work-
ers. Research in psychology, sociology, and management shows that receiving
aﬀective support from colleagues and having good interpersonal relationships
at work are positively associated with job satisfaction, job involvement, and
organizational commitment, and negatively with employee stress and absen-
teeism (see among others Price and Mueller, 1981; Riordan and Griﬀeth,
1995; Hodson, 1997; Ducharme and Martin, 2000; Nielsen et al. 2000; Morri-
son 2004; Wagner and Harter, 2006). Moreover, turnover intentions and ac-
tual turnover tend to be lower when workers experience social support from
co-workers (Price and Mueller, 1981; Riordan and Griﬀeth, 1995; Nielsen et
al., 2000; Morrison 2004; Mossholder et al., 2005). Social interaction with
colleagues is also one of the most missed job aspects under retired workers in
Australia (Shacklock, 2005) — and it is one of the main drivers of job search
among Dutch unemployed (Echtelt and Hoﬀ, 2008). Lastly, using time-use
data for France and the US, Krueger and Schkade (2008) show that workers
who are in jobs that entail more frequent interactions with co-workers are
more satisﬁed with their jobs and in a better mood during work time.
These ﬁndings have a clear managerial implication: In their struggle to
attract and retain workers, managers should strive to create and maintain
high-quality co-worker relationships. This view is conﬁrmed by managers.
Berman et al. (2002) report the results of a survey among managers in the
US and show that more than 85% of managers approve or strongly approve of
workplace friendships. A similar percentage reports that their organization
actively encourages workplace friendship. An obvious and widely used means
of doing so is to facilitate social interaction among co-workers through e.g.
creating coﬀee corners or a nice canteen, having Friday-afternoon drinks, or
organizing after-work social events (Cohen and Prusak, 2001). However, as
we shall see, when a company’s workplace policies are limited to facilitating
social interaction, typically too little social interaction takes place, implying
lower than ﬁrst-best proﬁts.
This paper studies an alternative, complementary way to promote co-
worker relationships: ﬁne-tuning workers’ ﬁnancial incentives. We develop a
principal-multi-agent model in which workers do not only engage in produc-
tive activities, but also in social interaction with their colleagues. Workers’
productive activities are, for convenience, assumed to be fully contractible.
Social interaction, however, is not contractible at all. We model social inter-
1action as an exchange of ‘attention’ between workers. Attention may include
showing interest in a colleague’s personal life, oﬀering a drink after working
hours, or any other kind gestures. While receipt of attention is always val-
ued positively by workers, giving attention is assumed to be costly, at least
above a certain level of attention. The reason is clear: Although giving some
attention can evidently be pleasurable, it is also time-consuming, expensive,
or perhaps even boresome at some point. In addition to these direct beneﬁts
and costs, we assume that social interaction creates altruistic feelings among
colleagues. More speciﬁcally, we assume that receipt of attention leads to
stronger feelings of altruism towards the giving agent. As we shall see, in
equilibrium this gives rise to reciprocal behavior: When a worker has been
treated kindly by a colleague, the worker cares more about his colleague’s
well-being, and adapts his future actions accordingly.
We obtain two main results. First, when the ﬁrm provides only individ-
ual performance incentives, too little social interaction takes place, imply-
ing lower than ﬁrst-best proﬁts for the ﬁrm.1 The reason is an externality
problem. Each worker internalizes the beneﬁts of giving attention to his
co-workers in as far as he is altruistic towards his co-workers. Since people
care more for themselves than they do for their colleagues, there is too little
social interaction in equilibrium. This is costly to the ﬁrm: If the ﬁrm could
induce workers to engage in more social interaction, workers’ job satisfaction
would be higher, allowing the ﬁrm to pay lower wages. Borzaga and Depedri
(2005) have recently provided some evidence for such compensating wage
diﬀerentials. They ﬁn dt h a t ,i nI t a l i a nn o n - p r o ﬁt organizations, satisfaction
with colleagues is negatively associated with wages. Consistent with this,
the ﬁeld study by Hamilton et al. (2003) shows that quite a few workers
of a Californian garment factory were willing to give up a substantial part
of their salary so as to join team production, suggesting high non-pecuniary
beneﬁts from working in a team.
Second, the ﬁrm can promote social interaction among workers by in-
cluding team incentives or relative incentives in the workers’ contract. Con-
sequently, the ﬁrm can achieve ﬁrst-best proﬁts by choosing the right mix of
individual incentives and team or relative incentives. The intuition behind
these results is as follows. Provision of team or relative incentives creates
1A similar result can be found in Itoh (1991b)’s study of social relations and incentive
contracts, of which we became aware only after completing a ﬁrst draft of this paper. In
contrast to our model, workers in his model are not altruistic. Consequently, our results
on optimal incentive contracts starkly diﬀer from his.
2externalities among workers. Team incentives create positive eﬀort exter-
nalities, implying underprovision of eﬀort (free-riding); relative incentives
create negative eﬀort externalities, resulting in overprovision of eﬀort from
the perspective of the workers. These externality problems are less severe
when workers are more altruistic towards each other. Hence, contracts with
team or relative incentives strengthen workers’ incentives to invest in co-
worker altruism. A natural way to do so is to engage in social interaction
with colleagues. In other words, by deliberately creating an additional exter-
nality problem among workers through provision of either team or relative
incentives, ﬁrms induce workers to resolve the initial externality problem of
too little attention provision. Incentives for productive activities are restored
through ﬁne-tuning the level of individual incentives. Optimal contracts thus
induce workers to exert ﬁrst-best eﬀort and to give ﬁrst-best attention. Con-
sequently, the ﬁrm achieves ﬁrst-best proﬁts.
This paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we give a brief
overview of related literature and discuss how our paper contributes to it.
Section 3 presents the model. In section 4 and 5 we examine the case of per-
fect contractibility and the case of non-contractible attention, respectively.
Section 6 concludes.
2 Related literature
Our paper builds on Rotemberg’s (1994) seminal analysis of human rela-
tions in the workplace. He argues that, when workers’ actions are strategic
complements and workers are paid as a function of joint output, they may
rationally choose to become altruistic towards each other. Altruism serves
as a commitment device to exert more eﬀort, which — due to the strategic
complementarity of workers’ eﬀorts — induces co-workers also to exert more
eﬀort. This is in the worker’s narrow self-interest because of the free-rider
problem inherent in team incentives.
We diﬀer from his analysis in three important respects. First, while
Rotemberg studies the eﬀect of team incentives in isolation, we derive the
properties of ﬁrst-best contracts which are shown to consist of a mix of diﬀer-
ent types of incentives. Second, in contrast to Rotemberg, strategic comple-
mentarity between workers’ productive actions is not a necessary condition
for co-worker altruism to arise in our model. The reason is that we allow
for a consumption beneﬁt from social interaction at work, which is absent in
3Rotemberg. Last, and most important, we do not allow people to directly
choose their altruistic feelings towards others. Instead, we assume that peo-
p l em a ya t t e m p tt om a k eo t h e r sf e e lm o r ea l t r u i s t i ct o w a r d st h e mb yb e i n g
kind, showing attention, paying respect, oﬀe r i n gf a v o r s ,a n ds oo n . T h u s ,
while as in Rotemberg an individual’s altruistic feelings are endogenous in
our model, the individual does not choose his feelings, but his feelings can
be aﬀected by other people’s actions.
The way we model social interaction between workers and how it aﬀects
co-workers’ altruism is close to the formalization of social ties in van Dijk and
van Winden (1997). In their model, as in ours, social ties are represented by
interdependent utility functions, where the weight assigned to the utility of
the other agent depends on the history of interaction.2 The positive relation-
ship between social interaction and the formation of social ties is supported
by a large number of empirical studies in several branches of the social sci-
ences. For example, Homans (1950) concludes from observations of workers
at the Western Electric Company that "favourable sentiments increase as
interaction increases" (p. 112). Additional support for this hypothesis can
be found in Baumeister and Leary (1995), van Dijk et al. (2002), and Hays
(1988). We diﬀer from van Dijk and van Winden (1997) in the application, as
they analyze the inﬂuence of social ties on the contribution to a public good.
Further, we do not make the assumption that individuals are myopic with
respect to the feelings of a colleague; instead workers may invest in social
relationships for strategic reasons, e.g. to alleviate externality problems.
In another related approach, Cox et al. (2007) have developed a model
where the marginal rate of substitution between an agent’s own income and
the income of another is inﬂuenced by actions of this other agent. In par-
ticular, an agent becomes more willing to pay for the income of the other
agent, i.e. becomes more altruistic, if the other agent has been more gener-
ous to the former. Recently, Cox et al. (2008) formulated a similar theory
in a more general (nonparametric) framework of preferences over one’s own
and other people’s payoﬀs. Both papers discuss results of existing laboratory
e x p e r i m e n t st ov a l i d a t et h em o d e l .T h er e s u l t so ft h e s ee x p e r i m e n t si n d i c a t e
that people do become more altruistic in response to kind behavior.
The results of our analysis are in stark contrast to those of Lazear (1989)
2In a related approach by Bolle and Kritikos (2006), the altruism parameter is not
deﬁned as the weight assigned to the utility of the other agent, but as the marginal utility
of a transfer to another agent. However, like in van Dijk and van Winden (1997), this
altruism parameter depends on the past interaction with this agent.
4on sabotage in tournaments and of Kandel and Lazear (1992) on peer pressure
in teams. These papers predict worse rather than better co-worker relations
under relative or team incentives compared to individual incentives (see also
Barron and Paulson Gjerde, 1997). While we obviously do not deny that
sabotage and peer pressure are relevant in many settings (see e.g. Garicano
and Palacios-Huerta (2005) on ‘dirty play’ in professional soccer), a number
of empirical studies suggest that opposite forces such as those studied in this
paper can sometimes dominate (Burks et al., 2009; Carpenter and Seki, 2005;
Heywood et al., 2005; Bandiera et al., 2005).
The economics literature provides two alternative ways through which
team-based pay may improve upon the work climate: by increasing workers’
willingness to help each other and by reducing pay inequity at the workplace.
Studies stressing workers’ helping behavior include FitzRoy and Kraft (1986),
Drago and Turnbull (1988), Itoh (1991a), Rob and Zemsky (2002), and Cor-
neo and Rob (2003). A crucial diﬀerence between these studies and ours is
that helping or cooperating is assumed productive in these studies, implying
that there is a team-element in production, which is not necessarily the case
in our model. Our paper can thus explain the prevalence of team-based pay
and their positive eﬀects on the work climate, even when there is little or
no complementarity between workers’ productive eﬀorts. The same holds for
studies which consider inequity-averse workers (see Bartling, 2007; Demou-
gin and Fluet, 2006; Englmaier and Wambach, 2005; Goel and Thakor, 2006;
Grund and Sliwka, 2005; Itoh, 2004; Rey-Biel, 2007). When workers dislike
pay inequality, team incentives may outperform both individual and relative
incentives, because team incentives generate little inequality of pay among
workers. We diﬀer from these studies in that workers are altruistic rather
than inequity-averse, and that workers’ altruism is endogenously determined.
One implication is that — in line with the empirical evidence mentioned at the
end of the previous paragraph — the introduction of team-based incentives
on top of ﬂat wages increases the quality of co-worker relations in our model,
while it is neutral in models of inequity aversion. Moreover, our results on
the eﬀects of relative incentives are also clearly diﬀerent from those that arise
when workers are inequity averse.
53T h e m o d e l
We consider a proﬁt-maximizing principal who employs two homogenous
agents.3 Agents produce output by exerting eﬀort. Eﬀort of agent  is de-
noted by  ≥ 0.T o t a lp r o ﬁts of the principal are:
 = ( ) −  − 
where the production function  satisﬁes the Inada conditions with respect
to all inputs, and  denotes agent ’s wage.
Agents care about three things: their wage, their cost of eﬀort, and their
net beneﬁt from social interaction with colleagues. We model social interac-
tion as an exchange of attention between agents. We assume that receiving
attention is pleasurable, while giving attention is costly.4 The utility function
of agent  is:
 =  − ( )+()+( ) (1)
where  ≥ 0 denotes the attention given by agent  to agent . The cost
function  i ss t r i c t l yc o n v e xa n di n c r e a s i n gi nb o t ha r g u m e n t sa n ds a t i s ﬁes
the conditions (00) = 0, (0 )=0 ,a n d(0) = 0, where sub-
scripts to functions denote partial derivatives. For simplicity, we assume
that (·)=0 .5 Receiving attention generates two types of beneﬁts to an
agent, represented by the functions  and . First, we allow for a consump-
tion beneﬁt from attention, captured by the strictly concave and increasing
function ,w i t h(0) = +∞.6 Second, we assume that receipt of attention
3Our results generalize to the case of an arbitrary number 2 of agents. Details are
available upon request.
4These assumptions are stronger than we need: They only need to hold at the margin
in the optimum. For instance, allowing agents to enjoy giving attention up to some point
would not change our results qualitatively. Clearly, in practice, receipt of attention is
sometimes costly; in those cases, our results do not carry over.
5Clearly, giving and receiving attention takes time and, hence, may increase worker’s
marginal cost of eﬀort. On the other hand, as shown by some of the studies we dis-
cussed in the introduction, social contact with colleagues can reduce stress and increase
job involvement. In practice, both of these arguments are likely to play a role, which
may explain why the empirical evidence on the relation between worker cohesiveness and
productivity is rather mixed (see Rotemberg 2006 for an overview). Itoh (1991b) provides
a thorough analysis of the consequences of these kind of interdependencies between eﬀort
and attention provision in a closely related principal-multi-agent model.
6As will become clear, our results are qualitatively the same in the absence of a con-
sumption beneﬁt from receiving attention.
6leads to feelings of altruism for the giving agent, which increases the utility
of the receiving agent. This is captured by the function ( )=,
where 0. The speciﬁc functional form keeps the analysis tractable.7 To
ensure an interior solution, we shall abstract from situations where  ≥ 1.8
That is, agents always care more for themselves than for others. Last, note
that the linearity of utility in income implies that the agent is risk-neutral.
The principal oﬀers a contract to each agent that makes each agent at
least as well oﬀ as his outside option 0. The principal can condition
the agent’s wage on the eﬀort of the agent himself and also on the eﬀort
of his colleague (( )). We shall speak of individual incentives when

( )  0,o ft e a mi n c e n t i v e sw h e n
( )  0, and of relative incen-
tives when 
( )  0.
The timing of the game is as follows. In the ﬁrst stage, the principal
oﬀers contracts to the agents, which they accept or reject. Next, agents
decide simultaneously and independently how much attention to give to their
co-worker. In the last stage, agents decide on the level of eﬀort they exert.9
4 Complete contract
We start by studying the benchmark case where both eﬀort and attention are
contractible. Full contractibility implies that there is no reason to condition
the wage on eﬀort, and so an agent’s compensation only consists of a base
7Clearly, the speciﬁc functional form implies that receipt of attention increases the
utility of the receiving agent only when the giving agent has positive utility, which we
assume. This assumption is, however, inessential. The analysis would be unchanged if the
function  depended on the diﬀerence between the utility that the giving agent obtains
and the utility  that he would obtain if the receiving agent provided the ‘selﬁsh’ levels
of eﬀort and attention (that is, ( )=( − )).
8Clearly, this is ensured when agents do not get a positive utility from  ≥ 1
.N o t e
that it is easy to extend the function to allow for unconditional altruism or spite, e.g.
( )=( + ),w h e r e 6=0 . This would not aﬀect our results qualitatively
except for situations where unconditional spite is very strong so that creation of co-worker
altruism through social interaction is ineﬃcient.
9Obviously, in the one-shot game that we study, the exact timing is important for the
results. In a repeated setting where agents alternately give attention and provide eﬀort,
this would be much less of a concern. In such a setting, it is important that the agents
have a ﬁnite horizon (e.g., retirement). In an inﬁnite horizon model, ﬁrst-best attention
may arise as equilibrium play without any contractual arrangements by the principal.
7salary in this section. The principal’s optimization problem is:
max

( ) −  −  (2)
subject to the agents’ participation constraints:
 − ( )+()+( ) ≥  (3)
 − ( )+()+( ) ≥  (4)
The ﬁrst-best levels of eﬀort and attention are described in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 The complete contract has the following properties:
1. Eﬀort of each agent is strictly positive and equates the marginal beneﬁts
of eﬀort to the principal with the marginal cost of eﬀort to the agent:
(·)=(·);
2. Attention by each agent is strictly positive and equates the receiving
agent’s marginal beneﬁts with the giving agent’s marginal cost of atten-
tion: (·)+(·)=(·).
3. The wage makes each agent indiﬀerent between accepting and rejecting
the contract, given the ﬁrst-best levels of eﬀort and attention:  =
 + (·) − (·) − (·).
The proof is given in the appendix. As usual, the ﬁrst-best contract in-
duces agents to exert the level of eﬀort that maximizes the joint surplus. The
principal optimally includes a positive level of attention in the contract. Even
though attention entails a cost for the giving agent, it produces a pleasant
working environment for the receiving agent, which allows the principal to
pay a lower wage.
5 Incomplete contracts
N e x tl e tu sc o n s i d e rt h em o r er e a l i s t i cc a s ew h e r ew o r k e r s ’a t t e n t i o ni sn o t
contractible; the principal cannot contract on workers’ actions like showing
interest in a colleague’s personal life, treating colleagues with courtesy, or
8giving aﬀective support. We keep the assumption of contractible eﬀort.10 As
we shall see, the principal ﬁnds it optimal to condition each agent’s wage
on the eﬀort of both agents, ( ). For convenience, we assume that the
wage contract is linear in both  and . This is innocuous: As will become
clear, the principal can not do better by oﬀering nonlinear contracts. Let 

denote agent ’s bonus per unit of eﬀort provided by agent  (representing
individual incentives) and let 
 denote agent ’s bonus per unit of eﬀort
provided by agent  (representing team or relative incentives). Further, let 
be agent ’s base salary. We solve the maximization problem of the principal
by backward induction, starting with the agent’s choice of eﬀort.





(·)(·) − (·)=0  (5)
Eﬀort has three eﬀects on an agent’s utility. First, when the principal gives
individual incentives, the agent’s wage increases with his eﬀort. Second,
when the principal has installed team incentives or relative incentives, agent
’s eﬀort choice aﬀects agent ’s income. Agent  cares about this eﬀect to
t h ee x t e n tt h a th ei sa l t r u i s t i ct o w a r d sh i sc o l l e a g u e .L a s t ,t h e r ei sac o s to f
providing eﬀort. The optimal eﬀort level equates these beneﬁts and costs at
the margin.
The comparative static eﬀect of social interaction on the agent’s eﬀort is
summarized in the following Lemma.
Lemma 1 Social interaction aﬀects the agent’s choice of eﬀort as follows:








implying that an agent’s eﬀort increases with received attention when
the contract includes team incentives, while eﬀort decreases with re-
ceived attention when the contract includes relative incentives.
10None of the results change when eﬀort is noncontractible as long as the principal can
contract on a (noisy) signal of each agent’s eﬀort (e.g. output). Extending the model to
allow for risk aversion of agents in the presence of noisy signals of eﬀort does not aﬀect
our results qualitatively.




The ﬁrst part of Lemma 1 echoes the results by Rotemberg (1994) and
Bandiera et al. (2005) on the relation between co-worker altruism and eﬀort.
When workers care for one another, they partly take into account the ex-
ternalities they impose on others. Compared to egoistic agents, this implies
higher eﬀort under team incentives and lower eﬀort under relative incentives.
As co-worker altruism increases with received attention, eﬀort increases with
attention under team incentives and it decreases with attention under relative
incentives. The second part of Lemma 1 directly follows from the separabil-
ity of eﬀort cost and attention cost in the worker’s utility function. Clearly,
when eﬀort and attention would be substitutes, agent’s eﬀort would decrease
with attention given by the agent.
In the previous stage of the game, the agents decide independently on
how much attention to give to their co-worker, taking into account the eﬀect
of their attention on eﬀort in the next stage of the game. The ﬁrst-order




























Besides the direct cost of attention provision, giving attention has two eﬀects
on the agent’s utility. First, when the agent has altruistic feelings towards
his co-worker, he enjoys the increase in his co-worker’s utility resulting from
the receipt of attention. Diﬀerentiating (1), it follows that the increase in







where the last term drops by the envelope theorem, using (7). Second, there is
an indirect eﬀect of attention provision through the co-worker’s eﬀort choice:
10By giving more attention, the agent induces the co-worker to change his
level of eﬀo r ti nt h en e x ts t a g e ,w h i c hi nt u r na ﬀects the agent’s utility.











where the last equality follows from applying the envelope theorem, using the
ﬁrst-order condition for optimal eﬀort (5). Clearly, an agent’s utility is only
aﬀected by his co-worker’s eﬀort when the contract includes team incentives
or relative performance incentives. Similarly, we learned from Lemma 1 that
aw o r k e r ’ se ﬀort is only aﬀected by received attention when the contract has
team or relative incentives. Taking these two results together, it follows that
the last term of the ﬁrst-order condition (8) is strictly positive when either
team incentives or relative incentives are part of the agent’s contract. That
is, both team incentives and relative incentives create an additional marginal
beneﬁt from attention provision for each agent. This beneﬁts t e m sf r o mt h e
eﬀect of attention-giving on co-worker altruism and, hence, on eﬀort. When
the contract has team incentives, an agent’s provision of attention induces the
other agent to exert more eﬀort in the next stage, which beneﬁts the agent.
Likewise, when the contract has relative incentives, the agent’s provision of
attention induces the other agent to exert less eﬀort in the next stage, which
again beneﬁts the agent. Lemma 2 follows.
Lemma 2 Both team incentives and relative incentives promote social in-
teraction among workers.
Intuitively, when team incentives are provided, agents invest in altruism
so as to foster cooperation. When relative incentives are provided, agents
invest in altruism so as to tame their colleague’s eagerness to outperform.
Substituting (6), (9) and (10) into (8) gives agent ’s ﬁrst-order condition












Our next result follows immediately and is described in the following Propo-
sition.
11Proposition 2 When the principal does not provide team incentives or rel-
ative incentives (
 =0for all  6= ), there is too little social interaction in
equilibrium.
Proposition 2 follows from a comparison of the ﬁrst-order condition for
attention (11) with ﬁrst-best attention as described by Proposition 1. In the
absence of team or relative incentives, the last term of ﬁrst-order condition
(11) drops. Comparing with the ﬁrst-best as described by Proposition 1,
it follows that there is too little social interaction in any equilibrium where
  1, as we have imposed. That is: As agents care less about their co-
worker than about themselves, the beneﬁts from attention provision are not
fully internalized. Underprovision of attention results. Note that there exist
multiple equilibria. First, an equilibrium exists where neither of the agents
give attention. When an agent believes that the other agent will not give
any attention, the second term of (11) is zero, implying that the agent only
faces costs from attention provision (as reﬂected by the ﬁrst term of (11)).
Hence, given that an agent expects to receive no attention, it is optimal for
him to give no attention as well. Second, depending on the exact shape of
the functions, one or more equilibria with positive attention exist. When
the function (·), representing the consumption beneﬁts from attention, is
suﬃciently concave, or the cost function (·) is suﬃciently convex in atten-
tion, there is a unique equilibrium with strictly positive attention.11 Anyway,
since in all possible equilibria attention is described by (11), attention is al-
ways at a suboptimal level. As a result, the principal’s proﬁts are lower than
ﬁrst-best.12




















subject to the agents’ participation constraints (3) and (4). First-best eﬀort,
attention, and proﬁts are achieved by the incentive contract described in
Proposition 3.
11The appendix describes the precise condition; it rules out that agent’s responsiveness
to received attention increases with received attention. In the remainder of this paper, we
shall assume that this condition holds.
12Note that, since this result holds for any level of the cost of attention, companies that
restrict their workplace policies to facilitating social interaction (that is, reducing agent’s
marginal cost of attention) will achieve lower than ﬁrst-best proﬁts.
12Proposition 3 When attention cannot be contracted, but eﬀort can, the
principal achieves ﬁrst-best proﬁts by oﬀering an incentive contract consist-
ing of a base salary, individual incentives, and team or relative incentives.
Optimal individual incentives are described by:


 = (·) − (·)

 for  6= 







for  6= 
where all functions are evaluated at the ﬁrst-best levels of eﬀort and attention,
as described by Proposition 1. The level of the base salary follows from the
agents’ participation constraints.
The proof is in the appendix. The principal can obtain maximum proﬁts
by including a mix of individual incentive pay and team or relative incentive
pay in the contract. As we have seen in Lemma 2, team or relative incen-
tives can be used to promote social interaction. In the optimum, the team
incentives or relative incentives are chosen such that, given ﬁrst-best eﬀort,
the agents provide ﬁrst-best attention as described in Proposition 1. Next,
the principal can ensure that agents exert ﬁrst-best eﬀort by adjusting the
individual incentives. When attention provision is stimulated through team
incentives, individual incentives are muted, since an agent enjoys the pos-
itive eﬀect his eﬀort has on his colleague’s wage. With relative incentives,
the eﬀort of an agent negatively inﬂuences the utility of his co-worker, which
in equilibrium is an additional cost of eﬀort. Individual incentives therefore
need to be adjusted upwards to restore eﬃcient eﬀort provision.
6C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
For many employees, social interaction with colleagues is one of the key de-
terminants of job satisfaction. We have studied the inﬂuence of ﬁnancial
incentives for productive activities on the quality of co-worker relationships
in a model where agents have endogenous other-regarding preferences. Fol-
lowing earlier work on the formation of social ties, we have assumed that
13the strength of a worker’s altruistic feelings towards a colleague is increasing
with the colleague’s kindness towards the worker. We have seen that, absent
team or relative incentives, workers do not invest enough in their relation-
ships with their co-workers, as the beneﬁts from relationship-building to the
colleague are not fully internalized. This externality problem comes at a cost
to the employer, as good co-worker relationships allow employers to attract
and retain workers without paying high wages. We have shown that em-
ployers can stimulate social interaction among colleagues by providing either
team incentives or relative incentives.
We have deliberately kept the analysis as simple as possible. An inter-
esting next step would be to study situations where the employer can only
contract on team output, so that team incentives serve a dual role: promot-
ing productive eﬀort and stimulating social interaction. In such situations,
too much social interaction may arise (as strong team incentives may be
optimal to boost production, but as a side-eﬀect create too much concern
among workers to please each other). In response to this, employers may
t a k ea c t i o n ss oa st oi n c r e a s ew o r k e r s ’c o s to fg i v i n ga t t e n t i o n .L i k e w i s e ,e m -
ployers may not be so keen on encouraging social interaction when relative
performance incentives are the sole instrument to promote eﬀort. Other in-
teresting extensions include heterogeneity in workers’ social preferences and
the sorting of diﬀerent types of workers to ﬁrms oﬀering diﬀerent incentive
schemes. Kosfeld and von Siemens (2007, 2009) make interesting steps in
that direction.
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P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1
Let  denote the Lagrange-multiplier for the participation constraint of agent

















































































from which the second part of Proposition 1 follows. The third part follows
from (A1) and (A3) which imply that  =   0, and hence the participa-
tion constraints bind.
15Condition for unique equilibrium with strictly positive attention

























Note that at the origin the slope of the best-response curve is inﬁnitely large,
as (0) → +∞. Hence, to ensure that there is a unique equilibrium
with strictly positive attention, it is suﬃcient that the best-response curve
is strictly concave when   0. The second derivative of the best-













 are always negative by the second-order
condition and by the concavity of the (·) function, respectively, and 2
is always positive in the relevant area where   0 (see (B1)). Hence,
as u ﬃcient (but not necessary) condition for the best-response function to



















which is satisﬁed when the (·) function is suﬃciently concave or the (·)
function is suﬃciently convex in attention.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3
The agent’s choice of attention is described by ﬁrst-order condition (11).
Comparing with Proposition 1, to achieve ﬁrst-best attention, the principal














 gives the expression for relative or team incentives in Propo-
sition 3. The optimal level of individual incentives follows along similar lines,
16using ﬁrst-order condition (5) and the expression for ﬁrst-best eﬀort in Propo-
sition 1. Lastly, note that we do not need to be concerned about multiplicity
of equilibria since, ﬁrst, the equilibrium where both workers abstain from giv-
ing attention is no longer an equilibrium when 
 6=0 , and, second, there
exists only one equilibrium with strictly positive attention when condition
(B3) holds, which is assumed.
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